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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Dominique Johnson was convicted of crimes related to 
his participation in a string of bank robberies and sentenced to 
835 months’ imprisonment. After we affirmed his conviction, 
Johnson filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme 
Court granted the petition, vacated our judgment, and 
remanded for reconsideration in light of Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). After reviewing Johnson’s 
arguments under Alleyne—as well as other arguments he 
raises—we will affirm. 
I. 
During the late spring and summer of 2009, Dominique 
Johnson participated in five bank robberies in the Philadelphia 
area. In early May, Johnson committed the first robbery by 
himself, carrying a BB gun. In late May, he committed the 
second robbery, again carrying a BB gun, but this time assisted 
by two others: Gregory Lawrence and Jerry Taylor. 
In June, Johnson bought a .40 caliber Glock pistol. 
Johnson, Lawrence, and Taylor discussed another bank 
robbery, with the plan being that Taylor would commit the 
robbery using Johnson’s newly-acquired pistol. Johnson and 
Lawrence advised Taylor on how to commit the robbery. 
In early July, the three friends (joined by a fourth who 
served as the getaway driver) executed their plan and 
committed the third robbery. Johnson served as the lookout 
while Taylor ran into the bank and demanded money. During 
the robbery, Taylor pointed his gun at one teller and hit another 
teller with it. In mid-July, the same group committed the fourth 
robbery in the same fashion: Taylor robbed the bank while 
brandishing the pistol, and Johnson served as the lookout.  
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After that, Lawrence and Taylor decided not to 
participate in any more robberies. Johnson recruited two 
others, Amin Dancy and Christopher Montague, to commit a 
fifth robbery at the end of July. As before, Johnson served as 
the lookout, and someone else (this time Dancy) went into the 
bank and demanded money while brandishing Johnson’s 
pistol. 
The FBI investigated the robberies and eventually 
arrested Johnson. A jury convicted him of two counts of 
conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 371; 
one count of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d); four 
counts of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2 and 2113(d); and three counts of aiding and abetting the 
use and carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1). 
For the first count of using a firearm during a crime of 
violence, the District Court imposed a sentence of seven years 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), which provides that 
if a person “uses or carries a firearm . . . in furtherance of” a 
“crime of violence” and “the firearm is brandished,” the 
minimum sentence is seven years. For the second and third 
firearm counts, the court imposed two 25-year sentences 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), which provides that “[i]n 
the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this 
subsection, the person shall . . . be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than 25 years.” Johnson’s total 
sentence for all ten counts was 835 months of imprisonment, 
or nearly seventy years. 
Johnson appealed, and we affirmed his convictions and 
sentence in a non-precedential opinion. United States v. 
Johnson, 515 F. App’x 183, 186-88 (3d Cir. 2013). Johnson 
then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, 
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which was granted. Johnson v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1538 
(2014). The Court entered a “grant, vacate, and remand” order 
stating: “Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for further 
consideration in light of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___ 
(2013).” Alleyne had been decided three months after 
Johnson’s appeal to this Court concluded. 
On remand, we granted Johnson’s motion to proceed 
pro se and he filed a brief raising numerous points of error, 
including that his § 924(c) sentences should be vacated under 
Alleyne. In its response, the Government relied heavily on our 
post-Alleyne opinion, United States v. Lewis, 766 F.3d 255 (3d 
Cir. 2014). However, before we heard Johnson’s appeal, we 
reheard Lewis en banc and decided it differently. United States 
v. Lewis, 802 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc). In light of 
Lewis, we determined that Johnson needed counsel after all. 
We appointed counsel and asked for supplemental briefing. 
Johnson’s counseled brief raised four issues: two relating to 
Alleyne, and two relying on other Supreme Court cases issued 
during the pendency of his appeal. We address those four 
issues first, and then turn to the arguments in Johnson’s pro se 
brief. 
II.1 
A. Alleyne Arguments 
Johnson argues that the District Court committed 
Alleyne errors by not submitting to the jury the question of 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and to review Johnson’s 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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brandishing or the question of whether two of the three 
§ 924(c) convictions were second or subsequent convictions.  
To explain the significance of Alleyne, we begin with 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). There, the 
Supreme Court ruled that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. 
Subsequently, in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567-69 
(2002), the Court ruled that Apprendi did not apply to facts that 
increased the mandatory minimum—only the maximum. 
Finally, in Alleyne, the Court concluded that Harris was 
inconsistent with Apprendi and overruled it, holding that “there 
is no basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise 
the maximum from those that increase the minimum.” Alleyne, 
570 U.S. at 116.  
The jury “indicated on the verdict form that Alleyne had 
used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence, but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was 
brandished.” Id. at 104 (internal quotation marks, alterations, 
and citation omitted). The using-or-carrying finding triggered 
the five-year mandatory minimum under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Id. 
The judge at sentencing found, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the firearm was brandished, and sentenced 
Alleyne to the seven-year mandatory minimum for brandishing 
under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Id. The Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded. Id. at 117. The Court ruled that because “a fact 
increasing either end of the range produces a new penalty and 
constitutes an ingredient of the offense,” it must be found by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 112. 
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1. Brandishing 
Here, the issue of brandishing was not submitted to the 
jury, but determined by the judge at sentencing. The seven-year 
mandatory minimum for brandishing, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), is two years longer than for using and 
carrying, id. at § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The parties agree that this 
was error under Alleyne. When analyzing Alleyne error, we 
first “address . . . whether the error was a sentencing error or a 
trial error.” Lewis, 802 F.3d at 453. We then determine whether 
the defendant preserved his objection to the Alleyne error. If he 
did, the standard of review is plain error; if not, the harmless 
error doctrine applies. Id. at 456-57. 
a. Trial Error Versus Sentencing Error 
Sentencing error occurs when a defendant is charged 
with and convicted of one crime, but sentenced for another. 
According to the plurality opinion, that happened in Lewis: the 
defendant was charged with using or carrying a firearm in 
relation to a crime of violence in violation of § 924(c) 
generally, but the judge sentenced him for brandishing in 
violation of § 924(c)(a)(A)(ii) specifically. Lewis, 802 F.3d at 
455. The error occurred at sentencing, because “the defendant 
was sentenced for a crime for which he was neither indicted 
nor tried.” Id. at 455 n.6.  
Trial error, by contrast, occurs when the defendant is 
charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for a crime, but one 
of the elements of that crime is not submitted to the jury. That 
occurred in United States v. Vazquez: the defendant was 
charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute more than 
five kilograms of cocaine, the jury was not instructed to make 
factual findings regarding the amount of drugs, and the 
defendant was sentenced based on drug quantities the judge 
found at sentencing. 271 F.3d 93, 96-97 (3d Cir. 2001) (en 
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banc). The error occurred at trial, because the jury was given 
incomplete instructions. Id. at 101.2 
Here, determining whether the Alleyne error was trial or 
sentencing error requires a close reading of the indictment. 
Johnson was convicted of using or carrying a firearm without 
a jury finding of brandishing, but he was sentenced for 
brandishing. If the indictment charged brandishing, there was 
trial error. Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 101-02. If the indictment did 
not charge brandishing, there was sentencing error. Lewis, 802 
F.3d at 458. 
The indictment count at issue, Count Five, charged 
Johnson with aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1) during the early-July bank robbery, but did not 
specify how the violation was committed—i.e., using or 
carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence under 
(c)(1)(A)(i), brandishing it under (c)(1)(A)(ii), or discharging 
it under (c)(1)(A)(iii). However, Count Five expressly 
incorporated specific paragraphs of Count One alleging that 
Johnson’s co-defendant “brandished a .40 caliber 
semiautomatic firearm” during the bank robbery.  
The rules provide that “[a] count may incorporate by 
reference an allegation made in another count.” Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 7(c)(1). Therefore, brandishing was charged in the 
                                              
2 We have sometimes referred to this second type of 
error as “trial and sentencing” error, reflecting the fact that 
two “inextricably intertwined” errors occurred—at trial 
(failing to charge the jury with a required element) and at 
sentencing (imposing a sentence based on an element not 
found by the jury). Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 101. In this opinion, 
we use the simpler term, “trial error,” to highlight the contrast 
between this type of error and pure sentencing error. 
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indictment, which distinguishes this case from Lewis. The 
Lewis indictment implied brandishing without using the word: 
it alleged that the defendants “burst through the front door . . . 
armed with handguns and a shotgun, announced a robbery, 
forced customers and employees to the floor, threatened to 
shoot them, herded the victims into the basement and again 
forced them onto the floor, and stole money, wallets and cell 
phones.” 802 F.3d at 460 (Smith, J., concurring). While those 
allegations were “clearly consistent with brandishing,” the 
Government apparently “deci[ded] not to charge Lewis with 
brandishing.” Id. (Smith, J., concurring). Here, by contrast, the 
§ 924(c)(1) charge incorporated the allegation that a gun was 
“brandished.” That is a distinction with a difference; the 
wording of the indictment matters. See id. at 461 (Smith, J., 
concurring) (“a defendant has the ‘substantial right to be tried 
only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand 
jury’” (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 
(1960))). 
Because Johnson was charged with and sentenced for 
brandishing, but the element of brandishing was not submitted 
to the jury, the Alleyne error was trial error. See Vazquez, 271 
F.3d at 101-02. 
b. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review is determined by the fact that 
Johnson relies on Supreme Court case law issued during his 
direct appeal. “[T]he general rule . . . is that an appellate court 
must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” 
Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 271 (2013) (quoting 
Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)). 
Therefore, when a Supreme Court decision “results in a ‘new 
rule,’ that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on 
direct review.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) 
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(quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)). 
However, while the new rule applies, Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(b) limits our review to plain errors. Henderson, 
568 U.S. at 270; United States v. Pervez, 871 F.2d 310, 314 (3d 
Cir. 1989). Here, although we had rendered our decision in 
Johnson’s appeal before Alleyne was decided, the case 
remained on direct review because our mandate had not yet 
issued. See infra note 5 and accompanying text. 
Under the plain error standard, an appellate court may 
exercise its discretion to correct (1) an error (2) that was 
plain—i.e., “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable 
dispute”—and (3) that “affected the appellant’s substantial 
rights”—i.e., there is “a reasonable probability” that it affected 
the outcome of the proceedings. United States v. Marcus, 560 
U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (quoting United States v. Puckett, 556 
U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). Even if the appellant meets those 
requirements, we will not remedy the error unless the appellant 
can show that it (4) “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 265 
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).3 
c. Application Of The Standard Of Review To The Error 
A court’s failure to instruct on an element listed in the 
indictment is not plain error if we determine that it is “clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury” would have 
found the element in question “absent the error.” Lewis, 802 
F.3d at 456 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 
(1999)). “[W]e properly consider the trial record on plain error 
review” of a trial error like this one. Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 102. 
Therefore, we will review the record of Johnson’s trial to 
                                              
3 The Supreme Court’s coincidentally-captioned 1997 
Johnson decision did not involve the defendant in this case. 
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determine whether the District Court committed plain error 
when it failed to submit the issue of brandishing to the jury. 
The first two plain-error factors are necessarily met—
i.e., there is an error that is plain—where, as here, a District 
Court’s ruling contravenes a later-issued Supreme Court 
opinion. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467-68. However, the third 
factor is not met in this case because there is not “a reasonable 
probability” that the court’s failure to instruct the jury 
regarding brandishing “affected the outcome of the district 
court proceedings.” Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262 (quoting Puckett, 
556 U.S. at 135). Bank employees testified that Johnson’s 
confederate, Taylor, brandished the gun during the robbery in 
question (the third robbery in early July). Johnson did not 
present evidence to the contrary. See Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 101 
(“[S]ubstantial rights will be affected if, for example, ‘the 
defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence 
sufficient to support a contrary finding.’” (quoting Neder, 527 
U.S. at 19)). In short, there is no reasonable probability that a 
properly-instructed jury would not have found brandishing. 
See Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103-05 (third plain-error factor not 
met where “there [was] never . . . any question” that evidence 
supported element not submitted to the jury). 
Because the first three plain-error prongs are not all met, 
we need not reach the fourth. Marcus, 560 U.S. at 265. If we 
did reach the fourth prong, however, we would not exercise our 
discretion to correct the error. Both we and the Supreme Court 
have concluded that where the jury is not instructed on an 
element of a crime, but the evidence of that element is 
overwhelming and uncontroverted, the fourth prong is not met: 
the error does not “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation” of the proceedings. Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 
106; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470. 
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Johnson points to the Lewis plurality opinion, which 
says that “[t]he motivating principle behind Apprendi and 
Alleyne is that judges must not decide facts that change the 
mandatory maximum or minimum; juries must do so. If we 
affirm because the evidence is overwhelming, then we are 
performing the very task that Apprendi and Alleyne instruct 
judges not to perform.” 802 F.3d at 456. However, the context 
was different in Lewis; the error there was sentencing error. 
The plurality refused to examine the trial record to determine 
whether there was evidence of a crime Lewis had not been 
charged with. Here, brandishing was charged, and the error 
was the failure to submit brandishing to the jury. Supreme 
Court precedent establishes that we review the trial record in 
cases like this one. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470. We follow 
the dictates of Apprendi and Alleyne by asking whether a 
properly instructed jury would have found, given the 
opportunity, that the gun was brandished (as charged in the 
indictment). In this case, the jury would have so found. 
2. Second Or Subsequent Conviction 
Johnson argues that the District Court committed a 
second Alleyne error because it did not ask the jury to 
determine whether two of his three § 924(c) convictions were 
second or subsequent convictions, but nevertheless imposed 
mandatory twenty-five year minimum sentences for “second or 
subsequent conviction[s]” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). 
This was not error. The fact of a second or subsequent 
conviction is not an element of the offense and therefore need 
not be submitted to the jury. Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998). Even if there is tension 
between Almendarez-Torres and Alleyne, as Johnson argues, 
we lack the power to resolve it. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203, 237 (1997) (“[I]f a precedent of this Court has direct 
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application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in 
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should 
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court 
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” (quoting 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 484 (1989))). 
Moreover, the language of Apprendi forecloses 
Johnson’s argument. Its key holding is that “[o]ther than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime . . . must be submitted to a jury . . . .” 530 U.S. at 
490 (emphasis added). We have observed that Alleyne did not 
alter the Almendarez-Torres rule. United States v. Burnett, 773 
F.3d 122, 136 (3d Cir. 2014). Almendarez-Torres is good law, 
and the District Court did not err by following it. 
B. Arguments Based On Other Supreme Court Cases 
Besides his Alleyne arguments, Johnson makes 
arguments based on Supreme Court cases that were issued 
during the pendency of his appeal: Rosemond v. United States, 
134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), and Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2551 (2015).4 The Government contends that Johnson 
forfeited these arguments because he did not raise them in his 
opening brief at the outset of this appeal (that is, his brief filed 
before the Supreme Court’s “grant, vacate, and remand” 
order). The Government also argues that we should not 
consider these arguments because they are “outside the scope 
of the Supreme Court’s remand.” Gov’t Second Supp. Br. 29; 
id. at 40-41. Neither argument is persuasive. 
                                              
4 The Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson decision is 
another coincidentally-captioned case that did not involve the 
defendant in this case. 
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The Government wisely refrains from making a frontal 
attack on the settled proposition that “[w]hen a decision of [the 
Supreme] Court results in a ‘new rule,’ that rule applies to all 
criminal cases still pending on direct review.” Schriro, 542 
U.S. at 351 (quoting Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328). Instead, the 
Government asserts that the Schriro rule “has nothing to do 
with whether the underlying issue was preserved.” Gov’t 
Second Supp. Br. 30. In other words, the Government posits 
that Johnson was required to include his arguments in his 
opening appellate brief, even though the law supporting them 
did not yet exist. The brief was filed in 2011, and the cases he 
relies on were issued in 2014 and 2015. 
At oral argument, the Government was unable to 
explain how its proposed rule could co-exist with Schriro, and 
indeed, co-existence is impossible. Supreme Court decisions 
apply to “all criminal cases still pending on direct review,” 
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351, not just appeals in which the opening 
brief has not yet been filed. To be sure, Johnson’s direct appeal 
has been extraordinarily lengthy, giving him a longer-than-
usual window in which to potentially reap the benefit of new 
law. But a case is still pending on direct review until our 
mandate finally issues, Finberg v. Sullivan, 658 F.2d 93, 99 (3d 
Cir. 1980), regardless of the amount of time that elapses. And 
here, the mandate has not finally issued.5 
The Government’s proposed rule is not only 
inconsistent with controlling precedent, it is unworkable. 
Lawyers cannot be required to advance arguments in opening 
                                              
5 The mandate was issued once in error, but recalled 
because Johnson had filed a timely petition for rehearing. It 
was later issued again, but was once again recalled in light of 
the Supreme Court’s order granting certiorari, vacating, and 
remanding. 
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appellate briefs that are contingent on a possible future change 
in the law. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 (rejecting similar 
proposed rule for trial objections because it “would result in 
counsel’s inevitably making a long and virtually useless 
laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported 
by existing precedent”). 
The Government’s other contention—that the Johnson 
and Rosemond arguments are outside the scope of the remand 
order—is also unsuccessful. The Supreme Court’s order 
remanding this case to us does not speak to issues other than 
Alleyne, and we will not interpret it as wiping away, sub 
silentio, the well-established rule of Schriro.6 Therefore, we 
will consider Johnson’s arguments based on case law issued 
during the pendency of his appeal. 
1. Bank Robbery Is A Crime Of Violence 
Three of Johnson’s convictions were for violations of 
§ 924(c), which prohibits brandishing a firearm “during and in 
relation to any crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
The predicate crime of violence was bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113(d). Johnson argues that bank robbery is not a crime of 
violence under Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2551, and therefore his 
§ 924(c) convictions should be vacated. We disagree.  
To determine whether § 2113(d) bank robbery is a 
crime of violence, we employ the categorical approach, which 
“requires us to compare the elements of the statute under which 
                                              
6 The Government cites cases ruling that issues outside 
the scope of a “grant, vacate, and remand” order cannot be 
addressed. Only one appears to involve arguments based on 
cases issued during the pendency of the appeal. See United 
States v. Duarte-Juarez, 441 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2006). 
Duarte-Juarez is not binding and we decline to follow it. 
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the defendant was convicted to the [§ 924(c)] definition of 
‘crime of violence.’” United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 83 
(3d Cir. 2018). Courts “may ‘look only to the statutory 
definitions’—i.e., the elements—of a defendant’s prior 
offenses, and not ‘to the particular facts underlying those 
convictions.’” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 
(2013) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 
(1990)). A crime is only a “crime of violence” if “the least 
culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a 
conviction under the statute” meets the definition. Wilson, 880 
F.3d at 84 (quoting United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 350 
(3d Cir. 2016)). 
Turning to the statutory definition at issue here, a “crime 
of violence” is a felony offense: 
(A) [that] has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person or property of another, or 
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property 
of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Thus, a crime can be classified as a 
crime of violence under either the elements clause, 
§ 924(c)(3)(A), or the residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B). 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered the residual 
clause of a different portion of § 924—the Armed Career 
Criminal Act, § 924(e)—that defines “violent felony” to 
include felonies that “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents 
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court ruled the ACCA residual clause 
void for vagueness because it does not clarify “how to estimate 
the risk posed by a crime” or “how much risk it takes for a 
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crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 
2557-58. 
Johnson argues that the § 924(c) residual clause is 
essentially the same as the ACCA residual clause, and 
therefore, the § 924(c) residual clause is also void for 
vagueness. However, as Johnson recognizes, our agreement on 
this point would not be enough to vacate his convictions. A 
crime is a “crime of violence” if it meets either the elements 
clause or the residual clause. Therefore, in order to reach 
Johnson’s residual-clause argument, we would need to agree 
with him that § 2113(d) bank robbery is not a crime of violence 
under the elements clause. 
Johnson focuses on § 2113(a), and specifically the fact 
that it proscribes bank robbery “by force and violence, or by 
intimidation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Intimidation, Johnson 
argues, does not necessarily require the “use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force” under the § 924(c) elements 
clause definition. However, Johnson was not convicted under 
§ 2113(a), but rather § 2113(d), which provides penalties for 
any person who, “in committing . . . any offense defined in 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or 
puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous 
weapon or device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). And “assault[ing]” 
someone or putting a life in “jeopardy . . . by the use of a 
dangerous weapon,” id., meets the elements clause: it “has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force,” id. at § 924(c)(3)(A). One cannot assault a person, or 
jeopardize his or her life with a dangerous weapon, unless one 
uses, attempts to use, or threatens physical force. 
Moreover, even if Johnson’s sole focus on § 2113(a) 
were analytically sound, it would be unavailing. We recently 
held that § 2113(a) bank robbery by intimidation—the least 
  
18 
culpable conduct contemplated in subsection (a)—is a “crime 
of violence” under a clause in the Sentencing Guidelines that 
is worded “nearly identically” to the § 924(c) elements clause. 
Wilson, 880 F.3d at 83. The Guideline at issue in Wilson 
provides that a “crime of violence” is one that “has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a); 
compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (crime of violence is one 
that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person or property of 
another”). 
We held that “[u]narmed bank robbery by intimidation 
clearly does involve the ‘threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another.’” Wilson, 880 F.3d at 84-85. Our 
conclusion was based on “a common sense understanding of 
the word ‘intimidation.’” Id. at 85. We also relied on our 
precedent, which “establishes that § 2113(a)’s prohibition on 
taking . . . ‘property or money or any other thing of value’ 
either ‘by force and violence, or by intimidation’ has as an 
element the ‘threat of force.’” Id. (quoting United States v. 
Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 541 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc), vacated on 
other grounds, 159 F.3d 774 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
Wilson forecloses Johnson’s argument that bank 
robbery is not crime of violence under the § 924(c)(3) elements 
clause. Therefore, we do not reach the question of whether the 
residual clause is void for vagueness. 
2. The Aiding And Abetting Instruction Did Not Amount To 
Plain Error 
Johnson argues that his aiding and abetting convictions 
should be vacated because the jury instruction on aiding and 
abetting violated Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1243. We conclude 
that any such error does not survive plain error review. 
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In order to aid and abet a § 924(c) offense (brandishing 
of a firearm), the defendant must know beforehand that a gun 
will be used. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1249.7 The Supreme 
Court ruled that a defendant like Johnson, who actively 
participates in a crime, “has the intent needed to aid and abet a 
§ 924(c) violation when he knows that one of his confederates 
will carry a gun.” Id. The “defendant’s knowledge of a firearm 
must be advance knowledge” because that “enables him to 
make the relevant legal (and indeed, moral) choice.” Id. With 
advance knowledge, a defendant can try to persuade his 
confederates to alter the plan, or he can withdraw from it. Id. 
Becoming aware of the gun as the crime is unfolding is not 
enough: the defendant “may already have completed his acts 
of assistance; or even if not, he may at that late point have no 
realistic opportunity to quit the crime.” Id. 
Here, the jury was instructed that “[t]he second element 
of aiding and abetting is that the defendant . . . knew that the 
offense charged was going to be committed or was being 
committed by the principal.” Supp. App. 1444 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, the jury could have convicted Johnson 
either on the basis that he knew the gun “was going to be” 
brandished, or that it “was being” brandished. See id. The 
second alternative—that Johnson was aware of the brandishing 
only as it occurred—is erroneous under Rosemond. 
                                              
7 Section 924(c) penalizes using or carrying, 
brandishing, or discharging a gun in relation to either a 
“crime of violence” or a “drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A). In Rosemond, the predicate crime was drug 
trafficking, while here, the predicate crime is a crime of 
violence. For the purposes of this opinion, we accept 
Johnson’s implicit argument that the distinction is not 
material. 
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Johnson argues that the aiding and abetting instruction 
was also erroneous as applied to his bank robbery convictions. 
Although Johnson does not articulate his logic, we infer that it 
goes as follows. A § 924(c) violation consists of a predicate act 
(a crime of violence) and the use or carrying of a firearm. 
Similarly, a § 2113(d) violation consists of a predicate act 
(bank robbery) and the use of a dangerous weapon. Arguably, 
therefore, because the two statutes are similar in structure, the 
Rosemond advance knowledge requirement applies to 
§ 2113(d) as well. 
Stated this way, Johnson’s reading of Rosemond has an 
appealing consistency. However, we need not decide whether 
Rosemond extends beyond § 924(c) because the plain-error 
standard is not met with regard to either the § 924(c) or 
§ 2113(d) convictions. Although the first two factors—error 
that is plain, see Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467-68—are present for 
the § 924(c) convictions and possibly also for the § 2113(d) 
convictions, the third factor is not met. There is not “a 
reasonable probability” that the error “affect[ed] the outcome 
of the . . . proceedings.” Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262 (quoting 
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135). If the jury had been properly 
instructed, there is not a reasonable probability that Johnson 
would have been acquitted, because there was ample evidence 
that he knew in advance that the firearm would be brandished 
(as § 924(c) puts it), and that a dangerous weapon would be 
used (as § 2113(d) puts it).  
The overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence 
showing Johnson’s foreknowledge of his confederates’ use of 
the weapon begins with his first solo bank robbery. There, 
Johnson brandished what appeared to be a pistol (actually a BB 
gun), at one point putting it to the head of one of the tellers. 
Later, Johnson described the first bank robbery to Lawrence, 
who wanted to commit a bank robbery too, because he needed 
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money. The two men planned and executed the second robbery 
together. As they were driving to the bank, Johnson gave 
Lawrence the same BB gun Johnson had used during the first 
robbery. When Lawrence entered the bank, he immediately 
pulled the gun from his pocket, jumped up on the bank counter, 
and demanded money.  
Lawrence testified that he, Johnson, and Taylor planned 
the third robbery and that Taylor was to go in the bank, hop 
over the counter, and get the money while carrying a gun—this 
time, the real gun that Johnson had bought. The getaway driver 
also testified that the plan was for Taylor to use the gun. Taylor 
executed the robbery as planned. During the robbery, he 
pointed the gun at a teller’s head. 
The same group of individuals then planned the fourth 
robbery. The morning of the robbery, Johnson got his gun and 
brought it to where the friends met up. During the robbery, 
Taylor held the gun to a teller’s head. 
For the fifth robbery, Amin Dancy was to be the stickup 
man, so Johnson gave him the gun. Dancy carried the gun into 
the bank, and during the robbery, he put the gun to a teller’s 
ribs. 
At trial, Johnson admitted the essential facts of the five 
bank robberies, but argued that he was not the ringleader and 
that the cooperating witnesses’ testimony lacked credibility. 
He did not present any evidence that would contradict the 
ample evidence showing that he helped plan each robbery, that 
the plan for each robbery included using and brandishing a gun, 
and that he provided the gun for each robbery. We therefore 
conclude that the third required factor of the plain-error 
analysis is not present: even if the jury had been instructed that 
Johnson needed to know in advance that the gun would be 
brandished, there is not a reasonable probability that it would 
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have acquitted Johnson of the aiding and abetting charges. See 
Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 104 (third plain-error factor not met 
where “there [was] never . . . any question” about the element 
that was not submitted to the jury).8 Therefore, the Rosemond 
error does not meet the plain-error standard, and we will affirm 
the aiding and abetting convictions. 
C. Johnson’s Pro Se Arguments 
The history of Johnson’s representation on appeal is 
recounted above. See Section I., supra. To recap: Johnson was 
represented and lost his appeal; the Supreme Court granted his 
pro se petition for certiorari and issued its “grant, vacate, and 
remand” order; Johnson proceeded pro se with our permission 
and filed a brief; we appointed a new attorney to represent him; 
and the new attorney filed a brief as well. Thus, on remand 
from the Supreme Court, we have before us both pro se and 
counseled briefs.  
The Government argues that we should not address the 
arguments in Johnson’s pro se brief because they were not 
presented in his opening brief (i.e., the one filed before the 
Supreme Court remanded the case to us). The Government also 
argues that addressing Johnson’s pro se arguments would 
violate our rule forbidding pro se filings by represented parties. 
                                              
8 If we were to reach the fourth plain-error factor, we 
would not exercise our discretion to remedy the error. Where 
the jury is not instructed on an element of a crime, but the 
evidence of that element is overwhelming and 
uncontroverted, the error does not “seriously affect[] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation” of the proceedings. 
Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 105-06; see also Johnson, 520 U.S. at 
470. 
  
23 
The rule against hybrid representation forbids a party to 
file a pro se brief supplementing his counseled brief. United 
States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 2012); 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 31.3. However, there is no hybrid-representation case 
involving an appellant who, like Johnson, filed a pro se brief 
with our permission and later filed a counseled brief after we 
appointed an attorney. Therefore, the usual rule against hybrid 
representation does not apply. In addition, the record does not 
show that Johnson was advised that the counseled brief would 
supersede his pro se brief, so it would be unfair to rule after the 
fact that his pro se arguments were for naught. 
The rule requiring appellants to raise all arguments in 
their opening briefs “yields in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” 
United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 532 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 
2011)). To weigh whether the circumstances are extraordinary, 
we consider “(1) ‘whether there is some excuse for the 
[appellant’s] failure to raise the issue in the opening brief’; 
(2) the extent to which the opposing party would be prejudiced 
by our considering the issue; and (3) ‘whether failure to 
consider the argument would lead to a miscarriage of justice or 
undermine confidence in the judicial system.’” Id. (quoting 
Albertson, 645 F.3d at 195). The factors need not all be met; 
instead, we balance them to determine whether to consider 
newly-raised arguments. See Albertson, 645 F.3d at 195 
(“Applied to the facts of [this] case, we believe the balance [of 
the three factors] weighs in favor of reviewing the merits 
. . . .”). 
Given that Johnson requested to proceed pro se because 
of his prior counsel’s failure to raise issues he believed 
meritorious, there is some excuse for the waiver under the first 
factor. Under the second factor, there is no prejudice to the 
Government because it filed a responsive brief addressing the 
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pro se arguments it now says we should ignore. The third 
factor, miscarriage of justice, is “somewhat similar to the ‘plain 
error’ rule, which allows appellate courts to correct an error” if 
it “affected the defendant’s substantial rights and ‘seriously 
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’” Andrews, 681 F.3d at 532 (quoting Albertson, 
645 F.3d at 196). As we will explain below, none of Johnson’s 
pro se arguments are meritorious, and therefore the asserted 
errors do not affect his substantial rights or the fairness or 
integrity of the proceedings. But because the first two factors 
weigh in favor of review, we will reach his pro se arguments.9 
1. Double Jeopardy Under Diaz 
Johnson argues that one of his convictions for 
brandishing a firearm under § 924(c) violates the Double 
Jeopardy clause under United States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467 (3d 
Cir. 2010). Because this error was not raised at trial, we apply 
the plain-error standard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Marcus, 560 
U.S. at 262. 
In Diaz, we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
requires each § 924(c) conviction to be tied to a separate 
predicate offense. 592 F.3d at 474-75. Here, Counts Five and 
Seven each charge Johnson with a § 924(c) violation. For 
Count Five, the predicate crimes are conspiracy (Count One) 
                                              
9 According to the Government, none of Johnson’s pro 
se arguments were raised at trial, which means the plain error 
standard applies. We will address the standard of review as 
follows. For the double jeopardy argument, which is 
colorable, we will explicitly apply the plain-error test. For the 
remaining pro se arguments, we will simply explain why each 
asserted error was not an error at all—and, thus, why the 
argument fails, regardless of the standard of review. 
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and the July 3 bank robbery (Count Four). For Count Seven, 
the predicate crimes are conspiracy (Count One) and the July 
17 bank robbery (Count Six). The Government concedes “the 
possibility of [Diaz] error” because “[i]t is . . . theoretically 
possible that a jury could convict for both Counts Five and 
Seven on the basis of the same predicate offense (Count One).” 
Gov’t Supp. Br. 22. 
The first two prongs of the plain error standard are met: 
there is error that was plain, as the Government agrees. 
However, the third prong is not met—the error did not affect 
Johnson’s substantial rights. See Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262. The 
jury convicted him of the unique predicate crimes (the two 
bank robberies, Counts Four and Six) as well as the common 
predicate crime (the conspiracy, Count One). As the 
Government points out, “it would have been irrational for a 
jury to . . . find Johnson guilty of [the two] [§] 924(c) offenses 
. . . by concluding that the predicate for each was only the 
conspiracy charge . . . .” Gov’t Supp. Br. 22. 
Even if the first three prongs of the plain error test were 
met, we would not exercise our discretion to reverse because 
the error does not affect the fairness and integrity of the 
proceedings. See Marcus, 560 U.S. at 265. Johnson was found 
guilty of two offenses that constitute unique predicate crimes 
for the two § 924(c) counts. 
2. FBI Agent’s Alleged Perjury 
Johnson argues that the only witness at the suppression 
hearing, FBI Agent Donald Asper, committed perjury, and asks 
us to remand for an evidentiary hearing on this topic. We have 
carefully reviewed Johnson’s lengthy argument, as well as 
Agent Asper’s testimony, and there is no need for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
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Agent Asper testified that a witness to one of the 
robberies observed the license plate number of the getaway car, 
a silver Buick. The getaway car was registered to a man named 
William Childs, whom Agent Asper found and interviewed. 
Childs provided Asper with an abundance of information. 
Among other things: Childs told Agent Asper that Johnson 
bought the Buick and asked Childs to register it in Childs’ 
name; he identified photos of Taylor, Lawrence, and Johnson; 
and he said that Taylor, Lawrence, and Johnson had been 
involved in bank robberies and had told Childs to take the heat 
for the car. Agent Asper then set up surveillance to find 
Lawrence. The surveillance was doubly successful, locating 
not only Lawrence, but also Johnson, who was in the silver 
Buick at the time. Agents arrested both men. A few hours 
later—unrelated to the arrest—a witness to one of the robberies 
identified Johnson in a photo array. 
Johnson contends there was no probable cause to arrest 
him, but instead of a traditional Fourth Amendment argument, 
he attacks Agent Asper’s honesty on the witness stand. In 
doing so, Johnson ignores every fact except that the photo 
identification took place after his arrest. The judge’s ruling at 
the evidentiary hearing puts this issue to rest: 
Mr. Johnson, I say some of this for your benefit, 
sir, because I can appreciate your thinking, 
honestly, because you’re thinking, you know, but 
they didn’t have the ID until later . . . . And I 
think here with the . . . getaway car, Mr. 
Johnson’s connection to that car, ownership of 
the car, Mr. Childs’ report to the Special Agent 
as to Mr. Johnson’s comments, . . . Mr. Childs 
picking out Mr. Johnson . . . , Mr. Johnson being 
in the car when they go to arrest Mr. Lawrence, 
and then Mr. Johnson getting out of the car and 
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together they go into the house, I think when you 
put all of that together . . . I do think that there is 
ample probable cause for the arrest of Mr. 
Johnson . . . before the ID . . . . 
Supp. App. 44-45. Johnson’s self-serving version of the facts 
does not undermine Agent Asper’s testimony. That testimony, 
which we have only partially recounted, outlines how the 
investigation unfolded and why the agents had probable cause 
to arrest Johnson. 
3. Tenth Amendment 
Johnson argues that “if a search warrant was required 
then the 10th Amendment requires the Department of Justice 
to obtain subject matter jurisdiction because the administration 
of criminal justice under our federal system has rested with the 
States.” Pro Se Supp. Br. 26. However, Johnson cites only 
Fourth Amendment case law, and cites no authorities to 
support his reading of the Tenth Amendment. We note that 
“[t]he FBI is authorized ‘to detect and prosecute crimes against 
the United States.’” United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 
481 (1984) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 533(1)). 
4. Sufficiency Of Aiding And Abetting Evidence 
Johnson argues that the trial evidence was insufficient 
to support his aiding and abetting convictions. However, we 
determined—in the initial phase of this appeal, before the 
Supreme Court’s “grant, vacate, and remand” order—that the 
evidence was sufficient. Johnson, 515 F. App’x at 187-88. 
Under the law of the case doctrine, “that decision should 
continue to govern” unless there are “extraordinary 
circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’” Christianson 
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816-17 (1988) 
(quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983)).  
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There are no extraordinary circumstances. We have 
already explained, in our discussion of Rosemond, that 
overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence showed Johnson’s 
prior knowledge that the gun would be used in the bank 
robberies. See Section III.B.2., supra. Viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Government, that same evidence permitted a 
rational trier of fact to convict Johnson of aiding and abetting. 
See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 
(3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). Johnson’s argument ignores much of 
the evidence and rests on his insistence that he was not present 
inside the banks, a fact that does not carry the legal weight he 
wishes to attribute to it. 
5. Effect On Interstate Commerce 
Johnson argues that the indictment needed to allege, and 
the jury needed to find, that his crimes affected interstate 
commerce. He relies on Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 
(2011), but that case stands only for the proposition that a 
defendant has standing to challenge the statute of conviction 
on Tenth Amendment grounds. Id. at 225-26. Bond says 
nothing about the requirements for the indictment or the proof 
at trial. In addition, Johnson contends that the FDIC does not 
replace money lost to bank robbery, and without FDIC loss, 
there is no effect on interstate commerce. However, we have 
ruled that § 2113 bank robbery “is an economic activity that 
. . . substantially affects interstate commerce and, thus, is an 
activity that Congress was well within its rights to criminalize 
pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause.” United 
States v. Spinello, 265 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2001). We lack 
the power to revisit this conclusion. Blair v. Scott Specialty 
Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 610-11 (3d Cir. 2002) (“It is this court’s 
tradition that a panel may not overrule or disregard a prior 
panel decision unless that decision has been overruled by the 
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Supreme Court or by our own court sitting en banc.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  
6. Motion In Limine 
Johnson argues that the District Court violated his 
constitutional rights by granting a motion in limine that would 
have allowed the Government to rebut Johnson’s testimony (if 
he had testified) with evidence of his statements to 
investigators. Johnson clearly feels that this ruling constrained 
his defense. However, the authorities he cites do not show 
error. For example, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), 
deals with deficient instructions regarding guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 
(1995), deals with failure to submit the element of materiality 
to the jury in a perjury prosecution.  
7. “Interlocking” Errors 
Johnson argues that the District Court committed five 
interlocking, reversible errors. We address these in turn. 
First, Johnson argues that he was prevented from 
testifying because he feared for his family and was assaulted in 
pretrial detention. However, the facts he relies on either are 
outside the record or constitute a continuation of his self-
serving (and unsupported) version of events. 
Second, Johnson argues that the District Court should 
have severed the first, second, and fifth robberies and tried each 
one individually. Joinder was appropriate, however, because 
the five bank robberies were a “series of acts or transactions.” 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b); see United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 
273, 287 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rule 8(b) governs joinder of multiple 
offenses). A defendant arguing for severance “must ‘pinpoint 
clear and substantial prejudice resulting in an unfair trial.’” 
United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 335 (3d Cir. 2010), as 
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amended (Oct. 21, 2010) (quoting United States v. McGlory, 
968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992)). Johnson argues generally 
that the joint trial exposed the jury to evidence of his other bad 
acts in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404. However, he 
fails to identify any clear and substantial prejudice, and we 
perceive none. 
Third, Johnson attacks the testimony of FBI agents and 
a cooperating witness. Johnson declares that Agent Shute 
relied on inaccurate data when testifying about cell site 
analysis, but he never hints at what the inaccuracies were. He 
argues that Agent Banis, who presented call detail records, had 
no independent evidence that Johnson’s cell phone number 
was really his. However, Agent Banis testified that Lawrence 
and Johnson’s sister identified the number as Johnson’s. 
Finally, Johnson argues that Lawrence offered improper expert 
testimony about the meaning of a phone call between Johnson 
and Amin Dancy. Such testimony offered by a cooperating 
witness is lay opinion testimony, not expert testimony. See 
United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Lawrence’s testimony was a proper lay opinion: it was 
rationally based on his perception (he was present during the 
phone call), was helpful to the jury, and was not based on 
specialized knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
Fourth, Johnson argues that certain evidence—video, 
pictures, and bank teller testimony—was cumulative and 
should not have been admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 
403. However, evidence about what took place inside the banks 
does not fail the Rule 403 balancing test merely because 
Johnson was the lookout, while his confederates—not Johnson 
himself—went into the banks. Nor is it needlessly cumulative 
to present evidence of the predicate crimes that Johnson 
conspired to commit and then aided and abetted. 
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Fifth, Johnson argues that the cumulative weight of the 
errors rendered his trial unfair. This argument fails because his 
other assignments of error fail. 
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm. 
